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IMPORTS AND SECTION 7 OF
THE CLAYTON ACT
Gertrude Susan Rosenthalt
Federal law dealing with acquisitions, despite frequent protes-
tations to the contrary, is quite limited. Section 7 of the Clayton
Act,' the usual statutory basis for an attack on an acquisition or
merger, 2 covers only those transactions the effect of which "may be
substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly"
in any line of commerce "in any section of the country." Although
section 7 raises a myriad of questions, one of particular importance
in recent years has been whether foreign imports4 should be
considered in determining the legality of an acquisition by one
American company of another.
This question has been squarely faced only once; 5 on that
occasionthe court held that imports sbould be included. In addi-
tion, a number of courts have included imports in determining the
effect of an acquisition without considering whether such an ap-
proach is proper. The antitrust enforcement agencies, on the other
hand, have urged both sides of this question. As imports become
an increasingly significant factor in the United States economy, the
t Private practitioner, Armonk, New York; former trial attorney, Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice. J.D. 1960, University of Michigan. I wish to express my
appreciation for the research assistance and thoughtful criticism of G. Carlton Adkins; of
course; he is not responsible for any errors appearing herein.
1 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
2 The Department of Justice has explained that "[a]lthough mergers or acquisitions
may also be challenged under the Sherman Act, commonly the challenge will be under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act." U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES 1 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as MERGER GUIDELINES]. Occasionally, an acquisition or merger may be
attacked under§ 1 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); see United States v. First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1967). The requirements for finding a violation of § 1 differ in some
material respects from those of § 7 and, insofar as they are relevant to this Article, will be
discussed hereinafter. See notes 16 & 119 infra.
Sometimes the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) challenges an acquisition under § 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). The same tests are generally
applicable to § 5 and § 7 proceedings although the language of the statutes is different. See,
e.g., Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 472 F.2d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 918 (1973).
3 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
4 As used in this Article, the term "imports" is intended to have a broad meaning. It is
'used to denominate goods produced in the United States by foreign companies, as well as
goods actually manufactured abroad by foreign or American companies. See note 8 and
accompanying text infra.
5 American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Pennzoil, 295 F. Supp. 149, 153 (D. Del. 1969).
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issue of whether they should be considered in determining the
effect of an acquisition grows in importance. 6 In some industries,
the numbers of imports are of such magnitude that an acquisition
might be ruled legal if imports were considered, but illegal if they
were not.
7
Theoretically, goods might be treated differently, depending
upon whether they were: (1) imported by a company with no
manufacturing facilities in the United States, (2) imported by a
company whose principal office is in the United States, or (3)
produced in the United States by a company whose principal
offices are abroad.8 All of these possibilities will be considered in
' See note 18 and accompanying text infra.
7 The question of inclusion or exclusion is especially important in cases involving
industries that are dominated by foreign imports or in which foreign imports exceed total
domestic production. In several cases dealing with such industries, courts have included
imports in the relevant market in determining the validity of an acquisition. See, e.g., United
States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196 (1963) (Court in determining that Singer, with
61.4% of relevant market, had violated Sherman Act, considered foreign imports relevant
because relevant market had been "increasingly preempted by foreign manufacturers");
United States v. Branch River Wool Combing Co., 320 F. Supp. 1324, 1326 (D.R.I. 1971)
(acquisition permitted despite prior consent decree, in part because of "substantial increase
in imports of wool products" which caused "general decline" in domestic wool industry);
United States v. Tidewater Marine Serv., Inc., 284 F. Supp. 324, 342 (E.D. La. 1968)
(proposed merger held legal because, inter alia, it would permit American company to enter
"burgeoning business of ocean towing of rigs"-market completely dominated by foreign
firms with no real competition); Dresser Indus., Inc., 63 F.T.C. 250, 267, 278 (1963)
(complaint dismissed in part because receipts of imported crude barite actually exceeded
United States production of such ore).
The Department of Justice has expressly recognized the potency of imports as a force in
maintaining domestic competition: "Particularly, in concentrated industries imports are an
important and significant competitive force, and their elimination even if accompanied by
some increase in export sales would not be justified." Memorandum concerning Antitrust
and Foreign Commerce Submitted to the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and
Tourism by Deputy Assistant Attorney General Walker B. Comegys, January 24, 1972 in 5
TRADE REG. REP. 50,129 (U.S. Dep't of Justice 1972); see Part V infra.
8 See, e.g., United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(treatment of British Petroleum); United States v. British Petroleum Co., Civil No. 69-954
(N.D. Ohio, Jan. 1, 1970); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1970 Trade Cas. 72,988
(FTC, consent decree). These cases stand for the proposition that a foreign company will be
treated as a domestic company only after establishing facilities in the United States. See also
Brief for Complaint Counsel, Litton Indus. Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRAnE REG.
REP. 19,918 (1972). This brief adopts the same view as the foregoing cases. It further
supports the proposition that foreign companies, with no manufacturing facilities in the
United States but who are actual competitors in this country because of their sales efforts,
will be treated as American companies. Cf. W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE
ANTITRUsT LAWs 345, 351 (2d ed. 1973). Fugate, formerly chief of the Foreign Commerce
Section of the Antitrust Division, states that cases involving foreign companies with United
States faciities are treated as United States companies. He also states that all imports,
regardless of source, are accorded the same treatment as articles manufactured in the
United States. His suggestion that a distinction would be appropriate, however, quoted infra,
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this Article. Although it has been suggested that shipments by
foreign companies from abroad be treated differently from ship-
ments by foreign companies from American plants and shipments
by domestic concerns whether the goods are manufactured here or
abroad,9 it is the author's contention that the better rule-and the
one supported by the weight of authority-is that all such ship-
ments should be treated in the same way.
I
THE STATUTORY SCHEME OF SECTION 7
A. General Considerations
The significance of imports in a section 7 case involving the
acquisition of one domestic company by another can best be
understood after a brief survey of the statutory scheme of that
section. "Determination of the relevant product and geographic
markets is 'a necessary predicate' to deciding whether a merger
contravenes the Clayton Act."10 The first step in a determination of
the legality of an acquisition is to find the appropriate line of
commerce in which to test the acquisition." This line of commerce
or product market must be related to a section of the country or
geographic area which is realistic with respect to the industry
involved.' According to the Supreme Court,
suggests a possible dichotomy between imports by United States and foreign manufacturers.
Id. at 351; see notes 117-18 and accompanying text infra.
9 This distinction was highlighted in the Brief for Complaint Counsel in Litton Indus.,
Inc., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,918 (1972). See also W. FUGATE,
supra note 8, at 351.
10 United States v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 618 (1974).
11 "The 'area of effective competition' must be determined by reference to a product
market (the 'line of commerce')." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324 (1962).
"In defining the product market... we must recognize meaningful competition where it is
found to exist." United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 449 (1964).
Of course, the fact that the acquiring and acquired companies do not deal in the same
product does not prove that § 7 has not been violated. Vertical acquisitions-acquisitions of a
source of supply or a customer-have long been the subject of successful attack under § 7.
See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964); Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp.
95 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd per curiam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965). So-called conglomerate acquisitions
also have been successfully attacked under § 7. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); Kennecott Copper
Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974); United States v.
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 268 F. Supp. 769 (D.N.J. 1966) (on discovery motion); United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (after trial); United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 246 F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (on motion to dismiss);
United States v. Penick & Ford Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965) (on motion for
preliminary injunction).
12 In United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), the Court stated
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Congress prescribed a pragmatic, factual approach to the defini-
tion of the relevant market and not a formal, legalistic one. The
geographic market selected must therefore both "correspond to
the commercial realities" of the industry and be economically
significant. 13
It can be a part of a state or a metropolitan area, 14 a single state, a
multistate area,15 or the entire United States. 16
The next step in the process is to determine whether the
acquisition may have the proscribed effect-i.e., a substantial less-
ening of competition in any line of commerce in any section of the
country. In making that determination, judicial authorities, as well
as the Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, mandate consid-
eration of the acquiring and acquired companies' share of the
relevant market, that is, the line of commerce in the section of the
country.17 In evaluating the market shares of the companies in-
volved, it is necessary to define the precise makeup of the universe
of products, companies, and geographic areas that should properly
be utilized to measure the effect of the acquisition being chal-
that before an acquisition is declared illegal, the geographic market must be defined, and
that "under normal circumstances a delineation of proper geographic and product markets
is a necessary precondition to assessment of the probabilities of a substantial effect on
competition." Id. at 510. See also United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656
(1974); United States v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 621 n.20 (1974).
'a Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336 (1962) (footnote omitted).
14 See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
15 See, e.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966). In that case, the
Supreme Court, in addition to determining that a multistate area was an appropriate
geographic market, also held the nation and a single state area to be appropriate geographic
markets. As the Court pointed out, however, the section of the country need not be
delineated "by metes and bounds as a surveyor would lay off a plot of ground." Id. at 549
(footnote omitted).
16 See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). Under the
Sherman Act, it has been held that the geographic market may extend beyond the political
limits of the United States. For example, in the recent case of Honeywell, Inc. v. Sperry
Rand Corp., 180 U.S.P.Q. 673 (D. Minn. 1973), the court found that "the geographic market
is the United States and foreign markets." Id. at 746. It further found that the "relevant
geographic markets for purposes of this lawsuit are the United States and the world market
(a combination of the foreign and United States markets)." Id. at 747. For a fuller discussion
of this case see note 119 infra.
It would seem that the outer limits of the geographic market in a § 7 case should be the
United States, but this point is explored hereinafter. See notes 26-33 and accompanying text
infra.
" The Justice Department explained, in accordance with case authority, that "[iun
enforcing Section 7 against horizontal mergers, the Department accords primary significance
to the size of the market share held by both the acquiring and the acquired firms." MERGER
GuIDELINES 8. However, as the Supreme Court pointed out in its recent decision in United
States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 498 (1974): "In Brown Shoe v. United States,
[370 U.S. 294 (1962)], we cautioned that statistics concerning market share and concentra-
tion, while of great significance, were not conclusive indicators of anticompetitive effects."
1975]
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lenged.'8 One or more of these elements is frequently the point of
contention in section 7 litigation.
In the present analysis, however, only one issue is of concern.
Should products imported into this country from abroad, whether
produced by foreign-owned concerns or by foreign subsidiaries or
affiliates of domestic concerns, he included in the universe constitut-
ing the relevant market?
B. Delineation of the Geographic Market
Frequently, companies that sell in a- certain geographic area
produce their goods elsewhere. There is a great deal of authority
for the proposition that the geographic market should be defined
not merely to include the location of production facilities of the
companies but also to include an effective area of competition. 9
The courts and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have de-
scribed with some precision the method by which such a geo-
graphic market should be defined. 20 In a recent decision defining
the scope of section 7, the Supreme Court stated that the relevant
geographic market is "defined... as the area in which the goods or
services at issue are marketed to a significant degree by the ac-
quired firm.' Other cases have defined the geographic market by
considering the area in which both companies involved in the
challenged acquisition, or even all companies in the industry,
market or distribute their goods.22 Another approach has been to
18 The issue is whether the merger... will have probable anticompetitive effect
within the relevant line of commerce. Market shares are the primary indicia of
market power but a judgment under § 7 is not to be made by any single qualitative
or quantitative test. The merger must be viewed functionally in the context of the
particular market involved, its structure, history and probable future.
United States v. Coutinental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964).
19 For example, in United States v. Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606 (C.D. Cal.
1967), affd men., 390 U.S. 712 (1967), the district court held the appropriate geographic
market to be that which "encompasses virtually the entire area of circulation and home
delivery overlap," not merely the area covering the publication sites of the two newspapers
involved. 274 F. Supp. at 619. In United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F.
Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the court pointed out that it saw no "reason for separating the
New York metropolitau area from the balance of the country merely because the constituent
banks were located" there. Id. at 917. See also United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418
U.S. 656, 666-71 (1974). In the latter case, the Supreme Court stated that "it seems fair to
assume that the area of significant competitive influence of some bank offices may extend
beyond town boundaries," and ordered the district court, on remand, to "delineate the
localized banking markets surrounding the sites where [the two banks] maintain their bank
offices." Id. at 671.
20 For a brief discussion of the FTC's definition see note 23 infra.
21 United States v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1974).
22 The significance of distribution patterns was highlighted in the recent decision in
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909
(1974). There the court of appeals defined the market as the entire United States on the
604
1975] IMPORTS & THE CLAYTON ACT
use consumption patterns, i.e., to consider the area to which buyers
supplied by these companies can turn for the product.23 Often
both approaches are utilized in the same case. 4
ground that the various producers of the product involved "compete with each other
throughout the United States." 467 F.2d at 7 1. Similarly, the district court in United States v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963), found
the entire United States to he the appropriate section of the country since all companies in
the industry "sell machinery and equipment throughout the country." 218 F. Supp. at 550.
The court in United States v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 345 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich.
1972), declared:
A relevant market is one that takes into account not only the product (the line of
commerce) but also its geographic area of distribution (the section of the country)
.... A geographic market must include commercial realities and at the same time
be economically significant.
Id at 120-21. The court further stated that transportation costs were a factor in defining the
geographic market:
The one predominant characteristic for beer is cost of transportation, but we find
from the evidence presented in this record that a properly located brewing
company enjoying successful elements of demand for its product would find little
difficulty reaching an eight-state area for a market.
Id. at 121. Accordingly, the court held the eight-state area to be the appropriate geographic
market.
23 The approach defining the geographic market by the area to which the buyer can
turn for supplies has been spelled out clearly by the FTC. Inland Container Corp., 66 F.T.C.
329, 359 (1964), modified, 69 F.T.C. 201 (1966). The case held that "the area in which the
principal shipments of the acquired plant" are made should not be determinative in defining
a section of the country. 66 F.T.C. at 363. Instead, it stated: "[W]e will give consideration to
sources of supply for Louisville purchasers in delimiting the geographic market." Id.
Previously, in Luria Bros. & Co., 62 F.T.C. 243 (1963), the FTC had stated the "established
view that the market is a sales area," but held that where there are many sources and few
buyers, "the area wherein the purchases are made . . . comprises the relevant geographic
market." Id. at 613. In Luria, the FTC explained the apparent dichotomy between its
definition and that which utilizes the distribution area. Citing Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961), it emphasized that when the product originates with a few
and is sold to many, the geographic market is the area in which the seller effectively
competes rather than the area to which the buyer can turn for the product.
62 F.T.C. at 613.
24 For example, in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the
Supreme Court held that "[t]he 'area of effective competition in the known line of commerce
must be charted by careful selection of the market area in which the seller operates, and to
which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies.'" Id. at 359, quoting Tampa Elec. Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961) (emphasis in original). This position was
reiterated recently in United States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974). The
FTC, in Permanente Cement Co., 65 F.T.C. 410 (1964), superseded in part, 67 F.T.C. 334
(1965), explained that the definition of a geographic market is a "two-step procedure." First,
it is necessary to determine "'the area of competitive overlap,'" where the acquired
company made most of its sales and the acquiring company competed with it. 65 F.T.C. at
489, quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963). Second, it is
necessary to determine "the area 'to which purchaser[s] [located in the area of competitive
overlap] can practicably turn for supplies.'" Id. at 489-90, quoting Tampa Elec. Co. v.
Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961). Similarly, in Bowl America Inc. v. Fair Lanes,
Inc., 299 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Md. 1969), the court included within the geographic market the
"area in which the seller operates, and to which the purchaser (here the bowler) can
practicably turn." Id at 1090. In United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F.
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The definition of the geographic market to encompass the
entire area to which customers can turn for their goods is undoubt-
edly proper in certain cases. 25 Nevertheless, approaches suggested
by a few cases, if pushed to their logical conclusion, could lead to
an improper holding that the geographic market in a section 7 case
can be broader than the United States. 26
In United States v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.
(Grinnell),27 for example, the Government sought to support a
claim that an acquisition violated section 7 on the ground that it
would foreclose "competitors from foreign markets. '2 The court
declared that "[t]he legal basis for this claim is doubtful, since
Section 7 proscribes acquisitions the effect of which may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition 'in any section of the country.' "29 In
any event, the court did not need to resolve the legal question it
posed, since it found the evidence that the acquisition would result
in a competitive advantage inconclusive. 30 In another case, how-
ever, a geographic market extending beyond the borders of the
United States was apparently adopted by a district court. In United
States v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey)3 1 the court declared:
Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), the court explained that the phrase "any section of the country,"
contained in Clayton Act § 7, refers not to a definite geographic area of the country but
to the geographic area of effective competition. [This] area depends first upon the
geographic area in which competitors market the relevant products and second
upon where, within the area of competitive overlap, the customer can practicably
turn for supplies.
Id. at 899. See also United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 511 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (four members of Court apparently considered consumption and
distribution patterns highly significant). Indeed, the Supreme Court, in United States v.
Marine Bancorp., Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974), despite its language defining the geographic
market by the marketing area of the acquired company, also considered the area "to which
local consumers can practicably turn for alternatives." Id. at 619.
25 See note 23 supra.
26 It should be noted that the use of marketing or distribution patterns alone would not
necessarily establish a geographic market including companies producing their goods abroad
but importing them into the United States for sale. Only an approach utilizing consumption
patterns-where customers can turn for supplies-would encompass these foreign com-
panies. For example, if two New York companies which sell their goods in Canada were to
merge, the geographic market utilizing distribution patterns could arguably encompass
Canada, but not Europe where, conceivably, some companies selling in New York are
located. If consumption patterns are relevant to a determination of the relevant market,
then consideration would have to be given to manufacturers in all those areas to which New
Yorkers look for their goods--conceivably including Europe.
27 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971).
28 Id. at 780.
29 Id.
" "While the government asserts that foreclosure of Grinnell's competitors from
foreign markets will result in substantial lessening of competition in the domestic market,
the record is barren as to precisely how this will occur." Id. at 780-81.
31 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966).
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United States producers sell potash for consumption, not only in
the United States, but also in the rest of the Free World.
Therefore, the market in which the potash producers must
compete is measured by consumption in the United States and
the rest of the Free World.32
Despite the suggestions contained in these cases, it would be
highly inappropriate to expand the market in a section 7 case
beyond the United States. The conclusion seems inescapable tbat
the statutory language "section of the country" limits the geo-
graphic market, at its broadest point, to the borders of the United
States. This conclusion, however, does not automatically exclude
from the market foreign companies selling in the United States.
Regardless of the method used to define the geographic market-
be it distribution patterns of the companies, consumption patterns
of their customers, or a combination of both-the boundaries so
established do not determine the identity of the companies in-
cluded within that market.33 Yet which companies should be in-
duded is an important question, deserving considerable attention.
32 Id. at 210. It should he noted, however, that in its conclusions, the court descrihed
the market at several places as "the United States potash market." Id. at 224, 227, 228.
Also noteworthy is United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 1964 Trade Cas.
71,215 (N.D. Cal.), in which the court dealt with the merger of two petroleum suppliers. It
held that the "entire United States is the relevant market or section of the country." Id. at
79,847. But is also felt that the "total supply to which competing refiners may and do turn
for their raw materials is the Free World crude oil production and reserves" except as
limited by the Government. Id. at 79,865.
In Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686 (D. Del. 1962),
the defendant argued that "data concerning exports is irrelevant," an issue quite different
from that raised here. In rejecting the defendant's contention however, the court discussed
the basic scope of § 7 in a way which could also be utilized in support of a claim that
the market in a § 7 case should be extended beyond the United States. It stated that
[t]he corporations, engaged in battle here, are selling goods for export and as such
are in "a line of commerce" in the United States. "Commerce" includes "commerce
* * * with foreign nations * * * ." The Sherman Act includes unlawful combinations
in restraint of export trade. Since § 7 of the Clayton Act is intended, as stated
above, to "nip monopoly in the bud," and to enable the courts to switch on the
red-light against incipient Sherman Act violations, it applies to the corporations
engaged here in sales for export as well as for national consumption.
Id. at 696 (footnotes omitted). It is possible that the court was not concerned with
competition outside this country but only with the competition in this country for sales
outside this country.
" To illustrate, suppose Company A, which produces and sells widgets in geographic
area X, acquires Company B, which also produces and sells widgets in area X. Unquestion-
ably, the effect of the acquisition of B by A will be measured in terms of the widget product
market in area X. Suppose, however, that Company C produces widgets in area Y and sells
them in area X. Should Company C be included in the market? Suppose further that
Company D produces widgets in area X but sells them only in area Z. Should Company D be
included in the market? These kinds of questions arise regardless of how the geographic
market is defined.
1975]
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II
THE UNIVERSE
A. Utilization of Sales Rather Than Production Data
The approach generally used to evaluate the effect of an
acquisition is to define the section of the country in general terms
and rather narrowly, but to include in the market all sales made
within that section.34 Thus the acquiring company's share of the
market is based on its percentage of all shipments in the area,
regardless of their source. This approach, logically applied, would
result in the inclusion of imports in the market.
The definition of the "section of the country" adopted in the
Justice Department's Merger Guidelines35 supports the utilization
of sales figures. The Justice Department Antitrust Division gener-
ally has indicated its preoccupation with "sales" rather than "pro-
duction. ' 36 Indeed, most cases generally center on sales statistics
rather than production data. In United States v. Von's Grocery Co. ,3
which involved an attack on the merger of two supermarket chains,
the Supreme Court's discussion of statistics was limited to the share
of sales attributable to these companies in the relevant geographic
market.38
A number of district court cases have also considered all sales
within the geographic market, regardless of source. In a case not
involving imports from abroad, but raising the question of whether
goods produced outside the geographic market should be in-
cluded, the district court stated: "[I]n the sale and distribution of
gasoline it is necessary to consider both the market area and the
source of supply . . . ."39 It therefore refused to "look to the
" See, e.g., United States v. Continental Oil Co., 1965 Trade Cas. 71,557 (D.N.M.);
cases discussed in notes 38-44 infra.
35 The total sales of a produce or service in any commercially significant section of
the country.., or aggregate of such sections, will ordinarily constitute a geographic
market if firms engaged in selling the product make significant sales of the product
to purchasers in the section or sections.
MERGER GUIDELINES 6.
" "The market is ordinarily measured primarily by the dollar value of the sales or
other transactions (e.g., shipments, leases) . . ." MERGER GUIDELINES 7. Instances where the
Antitrust Division has not followed this principle will be discussed in detail hereinafter. See
notes 132-51 and accompanying text infra.
37 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
38 Id. at 273-74, 280. A similar approach was followed in FTC v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 595 (1965), where the Court, relying only upon sales data, held that a
so-called conglomerate acquisition was illegal because of the reciprocity it made possible. It is
evident, of course, that the data most relevant in a reciprocity case is sales data.
39 United States v. Continental Oil Co., 1965 Trade Cas. 71,557 (D.N.M.).
[Vol. 60:600
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production alone in New Mexico and shut its eyes to the importa-
tion of gasoline from other areas in determining the effect of the
acquisition. 40
Another district court which considered sales data of prime
significance explained that "[w]hile many levels of activity in the
sugar industry can be identified, the conduct of sugar refiners in
selling their product is here of prime relevance. '41 It further
emphasized that "sales activity in each [area] justifies an evaluation
of the competitive factors of the merger in terms of its repercus-
sions in these areas. '42 And in still another case, the court, while
mentioning that the companies involved in the action were man-
ufacturers as well as sellers, utilized only sales figures, not produc-
tion data, in determining the validity of the acquisition. 43
Shipments "into" an area have also been held to be highly
significant in a number of FTC decisions. In a recent case, for
example, the FTC included sales of a company, with production
facilities outside the relevant geographic market in determining the
market shares of the merging firms.44
B. References to Production Data in Evaluating Acquisitions
In some cases production statistics have been used, thereby
excluding from the universe not only foreign companies, but also
some domestic companies producing the relevant product outside
of the relevant market area. These cases generally report sales
statistics as well.
40 Id. at 81,541. See also United States v. Crowell, Collier & MacMillan, 361 F. Supp.
983, 993 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd sub nom., Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971); United States
v. Lever Bros., 216 F. Supp. 887, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); United States v. Koppers Co., 202 F.
Supp. 437, 442 (W.D. Pa.), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 856 (1962).
41 American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387, 396
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), affl'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958).
42 152 F. Supp. at 398. In that case, some of the raw sugar cane was imported and
subsequently refined in the United States. The plaintiff produced beet sugar, which it then
sold; the defendant imported, refined, and sold cane sugar. When the defendant acquired a
substantial block of the plaintiff's stock, the plaintiff sued for damages. The court found that
the defendant's acquisition violated the Clayton Act.
43 Lunkenheimer Co. v. Condec Corp., 268 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
44 Golden Grain Macaroni Co., 78 F.T.C. 63 (1971), aff'd in relevant part, 472 F.2d 882
(9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973). For other FTC proceedings in which a
company's percentage of all sales in a relevant market, regardless of source, has heen
included, see FTC v. PepsiCo, Inc., 477 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1973); Ekco Products Co. v.
FTC, 347 F.2d 745, 749 (7th Cir. 1965); Diamond Alkali Co., 68 F.T.C. 1204 (1965);
Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F.T.C. 473, 697 (1965); Fruehauf Trailer Co., 67 F.T.C. 878, 929
(1965), modified, 69 F.T.C. 180 (1966); Foremost Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1049 (1962),
modified, 67 F.T.C. 282 (1965).
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Language supporting the use of production data can be found
in the landmark decision of Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.45 In that
case, the Supreme Court majority defined a horizontal acquisition
as "[a]n economic arrangement between companies performing
similar functions in the production or sale of comparable goods or
services. '46 In another case, the Supreme Court relied on data
showing all sales in the relevant geographic market, regardless of
source, to support its conclusion that the acquisition had an ad-
verse effect on competition.47 However, it also considered the
decline in the number of companies producing the relevant prod-
uct in the relevant geographic market.48
The FTC's position on the weight to be given production
statistics in section 7 cases is confusing. In some cases, it has
adopted the view that production facilities, as well as sales percen-
tages, should be taken into account. 49 In other cases, however, the
FTC has disregarded production statistics almost entirely in favor
of sales data. 50 The FTC apparently prefers to consider production
data only on a case by case basis.
Occasionally district court decisions have considered produc-
tion statistics, as well as sales statistics. In United States v. National
Steel Corp.,5 the Government alleged that the acquiring and ac-
quired companies were engaged in the production and sale of the
product involved. The court considered competition for sales but,
in rejecting the Government's claim in that case, it also looked to
the production facilities of the various companies in the industry. 52
Another court, in Boyertown Burial Casket Co. v. Walco National
Corp.,53 determined the validity of an acquisition by considering the
45 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
46 Id. at 334 (emphasis added). The Government had initially attacked the merger of
manufacturing as well as marketing facilities. The Supreme Court observed that the district
court had found that the merger of manufacturing facilities was "economically too insig-
nificant to come within the prohihitions of the Clayton Act" and noted that the Government
had not appealed from that portion of the lower court's decision. Id. at 335.
47 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 549-50 (1966); see United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
48 United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550-51 (1966); see United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
49 Brillo Mfg. Co., 56 F.T.C. 1672 (1960).
50 E.g., Golden Grain Macaroni Co., 78 F.T.C. 63 (1971), aff'd in relevant part 472 F.2d
882 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973); Procter & Gamble Co., 63 F.T.C. 1465,
1534 (1963), rev'd, 358 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
51 251 F. Supp. 693 (S.D. Tex. 1965), appeal dismissed, 386 U.S. 1000 (1967).
52 Id. at 700-01.
53 344 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
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company's share of all sales. However, it seemed to consider those
companies which both sell and manufacture the product involved
more significant than those companies which sell the product but
do only a little manufacturing. 54 In United States v. Northwest Indus-
tries, Inc.,55 on the other hand, the district court mentioned the
companies' positions as producers, but relied solely on sales data in
determining the validity of the acquisition.
Strong support for the proposition that production data should
not be utilized to determine the effect of an acquisition if such
data do not realistically reflect the competitive situation in the
market56 is found in the Supreme Court's 1974 decision in United
States v. General Dynamics Corp.5 7 There the government sought to
rely upon production statistics in support of its claim that the
challenged acquisitions of coal producers were illegal under section
7. The district court rejected statistics based "on past and present
production, s58 and relied instead on the quantity of uncommitted
reserves owned by the companies. The Supreme Court affirmed by
a vote of five to four.59 The majority's position that the universe
5' Thus the court carefully distinguished manufacturers according to the scope of
their operations and held that
the acquisition or disappearance of a firm that fabricates and manufactures casket
shells or completed units has a greater effect on competition . . . than does the
decline in the number of jobbers who complete the shells and sell them to funeral
directors.
Id. at 1363. See United States v. Reed Roller Bit Co., 274 F. Supp. 573, 578 (W.D. Okla.
1967) (court relied on sales statistics, but mentioned respondent's position as producer);
Vanadium Corp. of America v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686 (D. Del. 1962) (court
relied on both production and sales statistics). In United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.,
253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd, 385 U.S. 37 (1966), the district court found the
appropriate geographic market to be smaller than the United States because transportation
difficulties limited distribution of the product involved. The court utilized both universes:
sales and production. 253 F. Supp. at 137. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
377 U.S. 271 (1964), rev'g 214 F. Supp. 501, 507 (N.D.N.Y. 1963), the so-called "Rome
Cable" case, the district court had also mentioned United States production capacity in the
industry. See also United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1963) (court,
without discussion, mentioned fact tbat companies manufactured and sold product involved).
" 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. 111. 1969).
56 The focus of § 7 is on "competition." In the landmark Brown Shoe case, the Supreme
Court stated that "[tiaken as a whole, the legislative history illuminates congressional concern
with the protection of competition, not competitors." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 320 (1962) (emphasis in original). There is nothing in the legislative history to indicate
that Congress intended to limit the applicability of the section to competition from any
particular source-i.e., to competition among domestic companies.
57 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
58 Id. at 491.
" The majority pointed out that "[tihe focus of competition in a given time frame is not
on the disposition of coal already produced but on the procurement of new long-term supply
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should be measured by uncommitted reserves is of no help in most
cases. The dissent did not disagree that production data were not
useful in that case, but took no position on this point; it seemed to
believe that data relating to sales, for which commitments were not
previously made, were more realistic.60
Some support for a rule permitting the use of production data
only when they realistically reflect competition can be found in
cases facing the question of relevance of production used inter-
nally. In United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,61 which was de-
cided under the Sherman Act, 62 the Second Circuit included
Alcoa's internally-consumed production in measuring its position
in the market. 63 More recently, however, in American Smelting &
contracts." Id. at 501. It explained that "to an increasing degree, nearly all coal sold to
utilities is transferred under long-term requirements contracts, under which coal producers
promise to meet utilities' coal consumption requirements for a fixed period of time, and at
predetermined prices." Id. at 499. These sales "[did] not represent the exercise of competi-
tive power but rather the obligation to fulfill previously negotiated contracts at a previously
fixed price." Id. at 501. In tbat situation, the majority found that "a company's past ability to
produce is of limited significance, since it is in a position to offer for sale neither its past
production nor the bulk of the coal it is presently capable of producing .... Id. at 501-02.
In most cases, the Supreme Court said, "the unstated assumption is that a company that has
maintained a certain share of a market in the recent past will be in a position to do so in the
immediate future." Id. at 501. But, as in the case before it, "[e]vidence of past production
does not, as a matter of logic, necessarily give a proper picture of a company's future ability
to compete." Id. The majority concluded that "[a] more significant indicator of a company's
power effectively to compete with other companies lies in the state of a company's uncom-
mitted reserves of recoverable coal." Id. at 502. The opinion then reviewed the available coal
reserves for the companies involved and determined that the district court correctly held
that the acquired company "was a far less significant factor in the coal market than the
Government contended or the production statistics seemed to indicate." Id. at 503.
60 Four members of the Court dissented in an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas. The
dissent took no position on the utilization of production data. However, it argued that
defendant's share of production in the year before the acquisition was in excess of amounts
recognized as illegal in other cases. Id. at 526-27 n.23. The dissenters rejected the majority's
claim that the acquired company's weak reserve position "went to the heart of the Govern-
ment's ...prima facie case based on production figures," because, inter alia, this "weak
reserve position" was "postacquisition evidence." Id. at 523-24. The dissent continued:
It might be argued, however, that, if market share is to be determined by sales, the
production figures found by the court below are not the relevant ones for they
include production which goes to meet obligations incurred in long-term contracts
entered into in prior years. In terms of competition, if sales are the relevant criteria,
what is needed is a finding of "new" sales (sales of previously uncommitted coal) as
a percentage of total industry new sales ....
Id. at 527 n.23.
61 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), rev'g 44 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
r2 Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine
or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor . ...
Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
63 The district judge had "excluded that part of 'Alcoa's' own production which it
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Refining Co. v. Pennzoil United, Inc.,64 the district court excluded
production consumed internally from the market.65
It is evident that there is some judicial authority supporting
the proposition that production data can be of significance in a
section 7 proceeding. If, in fact, production data are given control-
ling significance in a section 7 case, then foreign producers should
be ignored, since the effect on competition must be considered
within the framework of a "section of the country." None of these
cases, however, supports such a result. Indeed, none of them
resolves the question of whether it would be appropriate to hold an
acquisition illegal if the acquiring and acquired companies had an
excessive share of the total production in the geographic area, but
only a small share of the sales, the difference being supplied by
imports of the product. To rely on production data in such a case
would unrealistically reflect the competitive situation and, under
General Dynamics, would be improper. 66
fabricated and did not therefore sell as ingot." 148 F.2d at 424. The Second Circuit, in an
opinion by Judge Learned Hand, disagreed. It recognized that "[tihat part of its production
which 'Alcoa' itself fabricates, does not of course ever reach the market as ingot .... Id.
Nevertheless, Judge Hand contended that this ingot "necessarily had a direct effect upon the
ingot market." Id. The court concluded: "We cannot therefore agree that the computation of
the precentage of 'Alcoa's' control over the ingot market should not include the whole of its
ingot production." Id. For further discussion of Alcoa see notes 140-47 and accompanying
text infra.
In United States v. Continental Can Co., 217 F. Supp. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), rev'd, 378
U.S. 441 (1964), the district court pointed to the fact that "[slome of the captive companies
produce cans for their own use and also sell to other users." 217 F. Supp. at 773. The
Supreme Court, however, without any discussion, made no attempt to distinguish between
cans sold to outsiders and those used internally. 378 U.S. at 459.
64 295 F. Supp. 149 (D. Del. 1969).
5 The court explained:
Pennzoil and Asarco do not agree on the relevant line of commerce in dealing
with these sales. Pennzoil contends that the line of commerce should be sales to all
fabricators, both captive and independent; Asarco contends that sales to indepen-
dent fabricators is the proper realm of inquiry.
Id. at 156. In the face of this conflict, the court concluded:
In view of the ability of a controlling copper producer to regulate its captive
fabricator's purchases from outside producers and the reluctance of outside pro-
ducers to rely on an ability to sell any substantial quantity of copper to captive
fabricators... the Court accepts Asarco's view that sales to independent fabricators
is the relevant line of commerce.
Id. See British Oxygen, Ltd., No. 8955 (F.T.C. Oct. 18, 1974) (Administrative Law Judge
concluded that "industrial gases produced for in-house consumption are not part of this
market as such gases are not resold in the market-place"); see note 110 infra.
66 The significance of General Dynamics for present purposes is the recognition by all
members of the Court that tbe universe utilized in determing the effect of an acquisition
must reflect tbe competitive situation. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S.
486 (1974). Imports entering into a market are an essential segment of that market.
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III
INCLUSION OF IMPORTS IN THE RELEVANT MARKET
Many cases have considered imports in evaluating the effect of
an acquisition. These cases can be broken down into three basic
categories: (1) those including imports manufactured abroad by
American companies; (2) those including all imports, regardless of
source; and (3) those including goods produced by foreign com-
panies at production facilities in the United States. However, the
cases do not necessarily distinguish their results depending upon
which of these situations exists.
A. Cases Including Imports Manufactured by United States
Companies
There should be no question that all products sold by domestic
companies are treated the same regardless of whether manufac-
tured here or abroad. Two cases illustrate this. In United States v. El
Paso Natural Gas Co.,67 the Supreme Court recoguized that Pacific
Northwest, the acquired company, received large volumes of
Canadian gas for its pipelines. This gas, in addition to other gas
from domestic sources, gave the company "opportunities" which
would permit ready entry into the California market and which
required the district court to consider whether it was a potential
competitor in the relevant market.68 The Supreme Court further
found that Pacific Northwest had the resourcefulness and eager-
ness to enter the California market and was a major market factor,
since it had one of the two major interstate pipelines serving a
nearby area.69 Accordingly, it reversed the district court's judg-
ment which had held the acquisition legal, and directed the lower
court to order divestiture without delay.70 In Standard Oil Co. (New
Jers) ,71 the district court also dealt with the significance of imports
by American companies. In considering the legality of the acquisi-
tion by Standard Oil of Potash Company of America, the court
67 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
68 Id. at 652-54, 661.
Nineteen years earlier, Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, 148 F.2d 416, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1945), a monopolization case under the Sherman
Act, concluded with little discussion that ingot made by Alcoa in Canada through a
wholly-owned subsidiary and imported into the United States should he included with
Alcoa's domestic production. See notes 61-63 and accompanying text supra.
69 376 U.S. at 658-62.
70 Id. at 662.
"' United States v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966).
[Vol. 60:600
1975] IMPORTS & THE CLAYTON ACT
found potash produced in Canada by American companies to be
"in competition with potash mined in this country. '7 2 The court,
therefore, had no trouble including these imports in describing the
size of the relevant market.7 3
The decisions in El Paso and Standard Oil (New Jersey) seem
eminently proper. Since, as will be discussed more fully below, the
United States has frequently expressed an interest, supported by
enforcement proceedings, in permitting the continued free flow of
imports, imports should be considered part of the total market
picture, particularly where the United States has some control over
the companies because they are domestic concerns.
B. Cases Including All Imports Regardless of Source
There is much support for the proposition that all imports,
regardless of their source, must be considered in determining the
validity of an acquisition. 4 For example, in American Smelting &
Refining Co. v. Pennzoil United, Inc.,75 a case involving an acquisi-
tion in the copper industry, the district court was faced with
the issue of whether "the proper index for measuring the partici-
pation . . . in this line of commerce" should be "domestic mine
production" or "domestic copper consumption. 7 6 The court held
that domestic consumption was the proper measure, but failed to
72 Id. at 199.
73 Id. at 205. The court, however, did not stress that the imports were by domestic
rather than foreign companies. It considered foreign companies relevant since it stated that
a French company not yet selling in the United States was a potential entrant into the market
because it had just started mining potash in Canada. Id. at 208.
74 The principal support lies in the case law discussed hereinafter. The Department of
Justice has stated that even the imports of foreign companies sbould be taken into account.
In a 1973 speech entitled "The Antitrust Laws and Foreign Commerce," Keith I. Clear-
waters, then Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General, explained the Anti-
trust Division's position as follows: "[Flor mergers among American firms, to the extent
that tariff barriers do not make foreign competition unlikely, we take the competition of
foreign firms into account in analyzing the effect of the domestic merger." Address by Keith
I. Clearwaters before the Association of General Counsel, in Hot Springs, Virginia, May 4,
1973, in 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,169 at 55,302-03 (1973). Often there is no controversy on
the point and the court need not decide whether imports should be included. For example,
in United States v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 231 F. Supp. 95 (S.D.N.Y. 1964), affd per
curiam, 381 U.S. 414 (1965), the Government argued for the inclusion of imports by stating
that the universe should be determined by the consumption of refined copper. Since the
defendent's theory led to essentially the same result, the court did not have to resolve the
issue.
The Department's position is not always consistent, however. Recently, in arguing against
airline pooling arrangements, it has indicated that it does not consider competition by foreign
airlines significant. See notes 132-39 and accompanying text infra.
75 295 F. Supp. 149 (D. Del. 1969).
76 Id. at 153.
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mention in its decision whether the imports were by American or
by foreign companies.7 7 Since the amount of copper imported into
the United States by foreign companies is not negligible,7 8 the
decision supports the inclusion of imports without regard to their
source.
7 9
Other courts have also included imports without expressing
any interest as to whether such imports were made by foreign
companies. In United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana),80 a federal
district court stated that in determining the validity of contested
acquisitions of domestic oil and gas reserves, "account must be
taken of the fact that extremely large quantities of foreign crude
oil are available to the domestic market."81 The court made no
distinctions based upon the nationality of importing firms. Al-
though it also considered production in the relevant market, the
court concluded that "[t]he share of consumption in the relevant
market is more meaningful than the share of production, since
consumption represents the actual demand to be satisfied. '82 Simi-
larly, another district court, in United States v. Bliss & Laughlin,
Inc. '83 included imports when it denied a preliminary injunction to
prevent an acquisition by the defendant corporation of Sierra
Drawn Steel Corp. Noting a substantial increase in cold finished
steel bars imported into the United States, 84 which enhanced
competition in this line of commerce, the court displayed no
concern with whether the sellers were domestic or foreign com-
panies. 85
7 Id. at 153-56.
78 For example, during the year the case was decided-1969-the United States
recovered 1,544,579 short tons of copper from domestically mined ores. 2 U.S. BUREAU OF
MINES, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MINERALS YEARBOOK 3 (1970). During the same year it
consumed 382,169 short tons of imported copper. Id. at 32.
79 In its discussion of the molybdenum industry, however, the district court did not find
it necessary to take into account the activity of foreign producers, because it held that the
acquisition was not anticompetitive in that business. 295 F. Supp. at 157.
80 1964 Trade Cas. 71,215 (N.D. Cal.).
81 Id. at 79,847.
82 Id. at 79,865.
83 202 F. Supp. 334 (S.D. Cal.), vacated and remanded, 371 U.S. 70 (1962), on reconsidera-
tion, 1963 Trade Cas. t 70, 734 (S.D. Cal.).
84 The court called attention to the fact that imports had increased from 761 tons in
1957 to approximately 8,983 tons in 1960, and in this same period imports entering the Los
Angeles, San Francisco, Washington, and Oregon customs districts increased from four tons
in 1957 to 918 tons in 1960. 1963 Trade Cas. at 76,167.
85 Id. at 76,167; see Dresser Indus., 63 F.T.C. 250 (1963). In the latter case the hearing
examiner, in dismissing the complaint, emphasized that "there exists an ample supply of
imported crude barite," but nowhere indicated whether such imported barite was owned by
domestic or foreign companies. Id. at 278. Production statistics were also utilized by the
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In a number of other cases, imports by foreign companies
have been explicitly included within the market. Courts have long
utilized this approach in Sherman Act cases. In United States v. Singer
Manufacturing Co.,86 for instance, the Supreme Court, in measuring
Singer's share of the United States market, included imports of
machines manufactured by foreign companies because of their
increasing competitiveness with domestic machines.8 7
The section 7 cases have followed this rationale. In United
States v. Tidewater Marine Service, Inc. ,88 the district court dealt with
the alleged anticompetitive effect of the proposed merger of two
companies supplying boats for transportation of supplies and
equipment to offshore drilling sites. In the court's view, a sig-
nificant argument by the defendants was that the combination of
one company's international experience with the other's ocean
towing capacity would "enable them to overcome the existing
barriers to entry into the apparently burgeoning business of ocean
towing of rigs-a market which is completely dominated by foreign
firms with no real American competition."8 9 This argument was
found to be persuasive. 90
The FTC reached a similar result in Diamond Crystal Salt Co. 91
when it modified an earlier order prohibiting Diamond from
acquiring within ten years any producer or distributor of salt and
approved the acquisition of an interest in a Panamanian Corpora-
hearing examiner. The decision was confirmed by the Federal Trade Commission. 63 F.T.C.
250 (1963).
86 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
87 Id. at 176. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258 (M.D.
Pa. 1965), vacated, 377 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 481 (1968), presents an
analogous situation. There the defendant urged as a defense to the antitrust claim that
foreign machinery was available to the plaintiff. The district court held this was not a
defense under the circumstances of that case since "no domestic non-United or foreign
machines, comparable to United machines in capacity and performance, and for which there
was service, parts and technical advice, were available to Hanover." Id. at 286. The court
thus implied that foreign production might be relevant where foreign goods were
sufficiently competitive with American-made products.
88 284 F. Supp. 324 (E.D. La. 1968).
89 Id. at 342.
90 The court added:
We realize, of course, that the mere existence of a valid business purpose for the
merger, with possible limited exceptions inapplicable here, will not rescue the
merger from the Clayton Act if it has a probable anticompetitive effect. . ..
However, we do feel that where, as here, we find no anticompetitive effects, then
the existence of a valid business purpose for the merger allays the inherent
suspicion cast upon mergers by the Clayton Act.
Id. at 342-43 (citations omitted).
1 [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,027 (FTC 1969).
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tion with title to a Chilean mine.92 It did so because it recognized
that products are in competition if they are sold in the relevant
market, whatever their source. 93
In Litton Industries, Inc. 94 which involved the acquisition of a
German company, Triumph-Adler, by Litton, products imported
by other foreign companies were included in the market by the
FTC, but only after considerable controversy. The hearing
examiner, in upholding the acquisition of the foreign-based com-
pany, relied in part on the fact that such a foreign-based company
could not ship substantial percentages of its typewriter production
to the United StatesY5 Complaint Counsel, in their brief to the
FTC, contended that the examiner erred, pointing out that
Triumph-Adler had made large shipments to the United States
market and contending that the record showed no "substantial
limitation on the ability of foreign companies to supply typewriters
to the United States. '96 Indeed, foreign-based typewriter com-
panies had continually increased their sales to customers in the
United States.97 In their brief, Complaint Counsel set out what they
considered to be the essential criteria for determining whether a
foreign company was an actual competitor in the United States
market: "(1) whether its sales were increasing, (2) whether its
geographic and customer coverage were expanding, and (3) its
attitude toward the future.'"9 8 They argued that in the present case
these criteria had been met.9 9 The FTC, after reviewing the facts as
to the foreign company's business activities in the United States,
92 Id. at 21,276-78.
93 According to the court,
acquisition by respondent [Diamond] of an equity interest in [the Panamanian
company] would provide respondent with certain access to Chilean rock salt
supplies which would in turn enable it to become a more effective competitor in the
East Coast market and open up the West Coast market for the first time to rock salt
in competition with other products.
Id. at 21,278.
94 82 F.T.C. 793 (1973).
95 [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 1 19,918 (FTC 1972).
96 Brief for Complaint Counsel in Support of Appeal from Initial Decision at 24, Litton
Indus., Inc., 82 F.T.C. 793 (1973).
97 Id., Brief at 25.
98 Id., Brief at 28.
9 Id., Brief at 29. Counsel contended that foreign companies had profitable businesses,
excellent customer relations, and steadily increasing advertising in the United States. It
further contended that the companies had introduced "significant new" machinery and were
"backed hy efficient production and an effective research and development program." Id.,
Brief at 30; see id., Brief at 81, 9 1. Finally, counsel pointed out that the percentage of sales of
foreign companies had increased markedly and that Triumph-Adler and foreign typewriter
companies maintained offices in the United States. Id., Brief at 25, 29-30, 81, 91.
[Vol. 60:600
IMPORTS & THE CLAYTON ACT
adopted Complaint Counsel's reasoning and found that the type-
writer manufacturers competing in the United States included six
foreign-based companies. 100
C. Treatment of Foreign Companies with Major Facilities in
the United States as Domestic Companies
In addition to holding that imports should be considered in
cases where a domestic company seeks to acquire a foreign one, the
Litton case illustrates another important point-that foreign com-
panies with domestic facilities are generally treated the same as
purely domestic companies. Complaint Counsel in Litton stated that
one of the foreign companies in the industry, Olivetti, "maintains a
modern typewriter plant in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and is not
regarded as a 'foreign-based' firm for purposes of this discus-
sion."101 The FTC accepted this contention and treated Olivetti as
a domestic company, pointing out that Olivetti sold typewriters
throughout the United States and had a United States manufactur-
ing facility.10 2 This approach is in accord with that recently ex-
pressed by the Department of Justice in its treatment of British
Petroleum.10 3
The problem of how to deal with British Petroleum under the
antitrust laws first arose in United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co. ' 0 4 Its
subsequent history presents an interesting situation, perhaps rais-
ing more questions than it answers. The action against Atlantic
Richfield was brought by the Government because of the acquisi-
tion by Atlantic Richfield of the Sinclair Oil Company. The district
court granted a preliminary injunction finding a reasonable likeli-
hood that the acquisition would in a certain geographic market
show an anticompetitive effect.10 5 To "undo" that anticompetitive
effect, Atlantic Richfield agreed to sell to British Petroleum all the
marketing properties of Sinclair in the northeastern states, the
section of the country where the probable anticompetitive effect
had been found.10 6
100 82 F.T.C. at 987.
101 Brief for Complaint Counsel, supra note 96, at 81.
102 Olivetti had previously acquired an American company. 82 F.T.C. at 989-90.
103 See United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd
sub nom., Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971); United States v. British Petroleum
Co., 1970 Trade Cas. 72,988 (FTC). For a discussion of the position maintained by
Antitrust Division officials see notes 111-12 and accompanying text infra.
104 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), affd sub nom., Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S.
986 (1971).
105 297 F. Supp. at 1074.
106 297 F. Supp. 1075 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (second decision in same case). The elimination
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British Petroleum was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a British
company, British Petroleum Limited, which the court described as
"among the seven largest integrated oil companies in the Western
World."'1 7  It pointed out that the parent company, although
having refining and marketing facilities in many parts of the world,
"has been unable thus far to enter and compete in the United
States market, though it has long desired to do so.'1 °8 The court
approved the acquisition, declaring that "[i]f the purchase agree-
ment is carried out, [British Petroleum, Limited] will, for the first
time, become a competitor in the United States market through its
subsidiary [British Petroleum] . *.... 09 This, according to the
court, would increase competition by substituting "a new and viable
competitor for Sinclair in the Northeast."" 0
of Sinclair through the merger would substantially lessen competition iu the gasoline market
in the northeast. Both Atlantic Richfield and Sinclair competed in the northeastern United
States with market shares exceeding those held illegal in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294 (1962) and United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); both were
"integrated" and wielded "very substantial economic power." 297 F. Supp. at 1064, 1072. In
addition, the industry in that area had evidenced a merger trend, high entry barriers,
increased concentration, and decreased competition. Id. at 1072.
107 Id. at 1065.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 1068. Similarly, the Government did not attack the proposed acquisition by
Lloyds Bank, a large British bank, of the First Western Bank, a large California bank. It
considered Lloyds a source of "new competition in our domestic markets." Statement by
Donald I. Baker, Director of Policy Planning, Antitrust Division, Prepared for Delivery at a
Symposium on Inter-relationship Between Multi-National Firms and Governments at
UCLA, Nov. 16, 1973.
Cf. British Oxygen, Ltd., No. 8955 (F.T.C., Oct. 18, 1974) (initial decision). British
Oxygen was found to be the leading manufacturer of industrial gases in the United
Kingdom, which produced and marketed industrial gases in many other countries, but not
in the United States. It "was the only one of the three largest industrial gases companies in
the world that was not operating in the United States." Id. at 35. British Oxygen "was
interested in becoming a nationwide competitor in the U.S. industrial gases market" (id. at
22), and "was recognized by members of the industrial gases industry in the United States as
one of the few firms possessing the capital resources, technical knowledge and expertise and
marketing capability required to successfully enter the U.S. industrial gases market." Id. at
35, 92. Further, the judge found it "was clearly feasible for [British Oxygen] to enter the
industrial gases market in the United States .. " Id. at 50, 92. On these bases the judge
concluded that British Oxygen "was a perceived potential entrant into the U.S. industrial
gases market' (id. at 93), and in fact was likely to enter the market (id. at 96), and since
British Oxygen exerted a beneficial influence on the market, its acquisition of a large United
States company in that market was a violation of the antitrust laws. See id.
It should be noted that British Oxygen was not a total stranger to the United States. It
had engaged in a joint venture in the United States with the acquired company (id. at 8) and
had sold other products in the United States through its American subsidiaries. Id. at 60. For
a summary of the case see 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,746 (FTC, Oct. 18, 1974).
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Subsequently, the union of the United States subsidiary,
British Petroleum, and Standard Oil of Ohio (Sohio) was proposed.
According to Judge Richard McLaren, then the Assistant Attorney
General in charge of the Antitrust Division, "BP was in effect an
American concern with a substantial business in the United
States.""' Consequently, he explained, the Antitrust Division
"analyzed the merger proposal precisely the same way we would
have analyzed a proposal to unite Sohio with another American
company in the position of BP's American suhsidiary." 1 2 The
government therefore brought an action," 3 which was ultimately
settled hy consent. 114
It is apparent from the Government's treatment of British
Petroleum that a foreign company with sufficient resources to
enter the United States market, but with a present inability to do
so, will not be considered a part of that market." 5 However, once a
foreign company has entered into the United States market, it
should not be accorded different treatment because it is based
ahroad.'
16
"I The Government's approach was discussed by Judge McLaren while he was Assis-
tant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, in his speech on "Antitrust Policy
Today." Address Before the National Industrial Conference Board 7, March 5, 1970. These
comments subsequently were quoted with approval by another Justice Department official.
See Address by Donald I. Baker, Director of Policy Planning, Antitrust Division, Before the
Committee on International Law of the New York City Bar Ass'n and the American Branch
of the International Law Ass'n, March 16, 1973, in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REGULATION
REPORT No. 53, at B-2 (March 19, 1973).
12 McLaren, Address, supra note 111.
Some courts have chosen not to adopt the Antitrust Division's analogy. In United States
v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1967), a case involving the
acquisition of Citizens National Bank by Crocker-Anglo, the district court considered the
effect of foreign banks on competition in the California market. The court insisted upon
calling such banks "foreign," although they "already [had] offices, and in one case, nine
locations, in California." Id. at 164. It concluded that the Government's proof had failed and
held the acquisition legal because, inter alia, the banks' share of any relevant market was too
small. Indeed "[ain adjustment for available resources of foreign bank subsidiaries and
representatives . . .would result in a further reduction." Id. at 180. Regardless of the
terminology employed, therefore, the substantive effect of the treatment of British Pe-
troleum and "foreign" banks was the same; both were considered to be in the relevant
market.
113 United States v. British Petroleum Co., Civil No. 69-954 (N.D. Ohio 1969).
114 1970 Trade Cas. 72,988.
"' See notes 108-10 and accompanying text supra. See also W. FUGATE, supra note 8, at
351.
116 See British Oxygen, Ltd., No. 8955 (F.T.C., Oct. 18, 1974) (Administrative Law
Judge treated British Oxygen as domestic company in lines of commerce in which it made
sales in United States through domestic subsidiaries); see note 110 supra.
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IV
AUTHORITIES RAISING A DISTINCTION BETWEEN DOMESTIC
AND FOREIGN COMPETITION
Wilbur Fugate, formerly Chief of the Foreign Commerce
Section of the Antitrust Division, has written that in section 7 cases
"[i]mports have been treated the same as domestic manufacture
thus far."117 In his view, however,
there is room for distinction. Imports are much more subject to
being cut off, and they can be cut off merely by a decision of the
foreign producer. Likewise they can be cut off by tariffs and
other governmental trade barriers. 118
Yet no section 7 case decided since Brown Shoe has taken the stance
that only domestic companies may be included within the relevant
market. 119
As mentioned previously, some cases, not involving imports,
consider production as well as sales data in determining the validity
of an acquisition.'2" Some cases involving imports also take this
11" W. FUGATE, supra note 8, at 351.
118 Id.
"' Cf. Vanadium-Alloys Steel Co., 18 F.T.C. 194 (1934). There the FTC, in finding a
violation of § 7 of the Clayton Act, considered respondent's share of domestic production.
Id. at 203. In so doing it pointed out:
There are approximately 24 domestic manufacturers of tool steel in the United
States, and 7 foreign manufacturers of tool steel sell their products in this country.
Of the 24 domestic manufacturers, 15 of these are the significant factors in this
industry and manufacture, according to informed opinion, about 90 percent of the
domestic tool steel in this country.
Id. at 202.
When courts fail to consider foreign production, the explanation can often be found in
a lack of familiarity with statistics relating to such production. For example, in some cases
the courts have relied on.statistics collected by the Bureau of Census, which collects data
solely from United States companies, and on trade associations, which often do not include'
foreign companies. See, e.g., United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441,459-60 n.10
(1964).
In the recent Sherman Act case, Honeywell Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 180 U.S.P.Q.
673 (D. Minn. 1973), the court definitively excluded imported products from the market.
The court found that "the geographic market is the United States and foreign markets for
sales or rentals of EDP [electronic data processing] products manufactured in the United
States." Id. at 746. However, the case must be distinguished for several reasons. First, the
issue arose under the Sherman Act, not the Clayton Act. Foreign markets for United States
products have long been recognized as appropriate markets in a Sherman Act case. See, e.g.,
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 706-07 (1962).
Second, at issue was the question of the validity of the" original computer patent in the
United States. A valid patent is a lawful monopoly only within the country where the patent
is issued. Third and most significant, the record showed that there were no significant
producers of EDP products outside the United States; hence foreigu manufacturers were
irrelevant. Id. at 734-36.
2. See notes 45-55 and accompanying text supra.
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approach and thereby exclude foreign companies from the "pro-
duction" universe. In Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey),' 2' the court's
discussion touched on production statistics, but did not seem to
rely on them. 122 In Standard Oil Co. (Indiana),123 the court spe-
cifically referred to the defendant's share of domestic production at
two points in its opinion. 24 In neither case was the volume of
imports found to be determinative-i.e., not compelling one result if
imports were included and another if they were excluded. There-
fore, they do not answer the question of what would happen if the
"numbers" had been against the defendant without imports but in its
favor with imports.
Within the last few years, however, the antitrust enforcement
agencies have sought to exclude imports in measuring market
shares in some cases. None of these cases has been finally litigated
to date, but they represent a significant attempt to change the
existing law. In a complaint filed against Rockwell International
Corporation in 1971, the FTC charged a violation of section 7 by
reason of the acquisition of one American machinery manufac-
turer by another domestic manufacturer, in a market in which
there was a large volume of imports.1 25 Complaint Counsel in the
resulting case contended that there existed "two separate mar-
kets,"'126 explaining that: "[o]ne, quite clearly, is of sales in the
United States, whether of domestically made or imported machin-
ery. The other market is the total production by U.S. manufactur-
ers, including both domestic sales and exports."'127 Complaint
Counsel cited no authority to support their second market, which
excluded imports. They argued that "foreign manufacturers can-
not be treated as if they were identical to domestic manufacturers,"
because imports might in the future be limited by tariffs, a cur-
rency revaluation, or even a ban, and that United States buyers
121 United States v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966).
122 Id. at 208; see notes 72-73 and accompanying text supra.
123 United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 1964 Trade Cas. 71,215 (N.D. Cal.).
124 Id. at 79,854, 79,859. See also Dresser Indus., Inc., 63 F.T.C. 250 (1963). There the
FTC stated market percentages in terms of "total demonstrated domestic reserves available
for the relevant market." Id. at 292. It also reported respondent's percentage of a universe
consisting of total production in the relevant area plus imports. Id.
125 North American Rockwell Corp., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
19,630 (FTC 1971).
126 Trial Memorandum of Complaint Counsel, at 10, North American Rockwell Corp.,
[1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,448 (FTC 1971). Complaint Counsel's
argument was couched in terms of the scope of the line of commerce, rather than in terms
of what universe should be used in measuring respondent's position.
127 Id.
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would, if other factors were "relatively equal," prefer to purchase
United States machinery. 128 In conclusion, Complaint Counsel
contended that a "quite possible scenario" would be that some
circumstance would occur that would create a "highly concentrated
monopoly situation in the U.S. market."'129 Rockwell disagreed,
pointing out that Complaint Counsel's "scenario" dealt with "pos-
sibilities" not probabilities, as required by the antitrust laws and,
indeed, importers were consistently improving their position at the
expense of American manufacturers. 130 The matter was settled
before adjudication by the administrative law judge and therefore
offers little guidance here.' 3'
Despite the remarks by Justice Department officials quoted
hereinafter emphasizing the significance of imports, 32 the Anti-
trust Division staff also has contended recently, in comments before
the Civil Aeronautics Board, 33 that domestic companies are to be
distinguished from foreign concerns and considered separately. In
effect, the staff proposed dividing the aviation industry into two
segments: domestic carriers and foreign carriers. 34
The comments were occasioned by an application by Pan
American World Airways
to permit Pan American and its primary U.S.-flag competitor in
North Atlantic air transportation, Trans World Airlines, Inc.
(TWA) to engage in discussions of consolidation and/or coordi-
128 Id. at 11.
129 Id.
130 Trial Memorandum of Respondent at 30-32, North American Rockwell Corp.,
[1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP,. 19,448 (FTC 1971).
131 Rockwell Int'l Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,503 (FTC 1974). Since the termination
of that proceeding, the FTC apparently has again sought to exclude imports from a market.
It has challenged the acquisitions of one domestic wine producer by another in Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. $ 20,587 (FTC, filed Sept. 10, 1974), contending that the
acquisition would substantially lessen competition in production, distribution, and/or sale of
wine products in the United States. The complaint relies upon three separate sets of
statistics: (1) wine sales in the United States, (2) wine products sold in the United States, and
(3) sales of domestically produed wine in the United States.
Cf. FTC Complaint, RSR Corp., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 20,566 (FTC, filed April 1, 1974).
In the latter instance Complaint Counsel set up two relevant markets: (1) the "U.S. market,"
which it defined as including both United States-produced and imported lead, and (2) the
United States secondary lead market, which was defined without any specific reference to
imports. Based upon the data in the complaint, if there are any imports of secondary lead,
they apparently were included.
132 See notes 158-63 & 193-95 and accompanying text infra.
133 United States Department of Justice, Comments in Application of Pan American
World Airways for Emergency Authorization of Carriers, No. 26516 (CAB, April 2, 1974).
134 See id. at 5-6.
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nation of their services and revenues on the many North Atlantic
routes on which they compete.13 5
The Division opposed Pan American's application, explaining in its
Comments that the "general problem alleged [by Pan Am] is an
excess of competition, apparently primarily foreign-flag competi-
tion, on the North Atlantic routes in issue."136 The staff argued
that federal regulatory agencies had determined in the past that
competition among United States flag carriers "would maximize
U.S. participation in the markets in question, and over the long
run, those decisions have led to a high participation of U.S. carriers
in the traffic in those markets."137 The Comments completely
separated the three domestic carriers from the twenty-one foreign
carriers in the business and argued against the application as though
the foreign carriers did not exist.13 8 The Civil Aeronautics Board,
however, did not agree with the Antitrust Division and granted Pan
American's requests.1 39
Language can be found in a few other cases supporting a
distinction between domestic and foreign competition. One of the
early cases to discuss this distinction was the Alcoa case,1 40 decided
under section 2 of the Sherman Act.1 41 In that case, the Govern-
ment took the position that Alcoa had a monopoly in the
aluminum industry because it was "the single producer of 'virgin'
ingot in the United States." 142 In contrast, the defendant argued
"that the fact that it alone continued to make 'virgin' ingot in this
country did not, and does not, give it a monopoly of the market;
that it was always subject to the competition of imported 'virgin'
135 Id. at 1.
136 Id. at 7. There are three United States air carriers and 21 foreign air carriers
providing scheduled passenger service between the United States and Europe.
137 Id. The Division expressed its belief that "the interests of all persons affected by the
international air transportation industry are better served by the present system of competi-
tion among U.S.-flag carriers than by pooling," (id. at 2), which it considered for "competi-
tive purposes... tantamount to a merger of the two carriers for the routes involved." Id. at
4.
138 It must be recognized that tbese air transportation cases can be distinguished
because the cases arise not under the antitrust laws but under the Federal Aviation Act of
1958. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970). Indeed, nowhere in its Comments did the Division cite
the antitrust laws; instead, it relied solely upon the langnage of the Federal Aviation Act.
United States Department of Jdstice, Comments, supra note 133, at 5.
139 CAB Order No. 74-4-104 (April 19, 1974) (unreported).
140 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
141 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970); see note 62 supra.
142 148 F.2d at 423.
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ingot.' 43 Judge Learned Hand, speaking for the Second Circuit,
noted that from one standpoint the distinction between domestic
and foreign competition might form a basis for regarding domestic
competition as less important than foreign competition. 44 He
stated that
the first is limited in quantity, and can increase only by an
increase in plant and personnel; the second is of producers who,
we must assume, produce much more than they import, and
whom a rise in price will presumably induce immediately to
divert to the American market what they have been selling
elsewhere. It is entirely consistent with the evidence that it was
the threat of greater foreign imports which kept "Alcoa's" prices
where they were, and prevented it from exploiting its advantage
as sole domestic producer; indeed, it is hard to resist the conclu-
sion that potential imports did put a "ceiling" upon those
prices.' 45
On balance, however, Judge Hand found other aspects of the
distinction to be 'of greater significance, stressing that
within the limits afforded by the tariff and the cost of transporta-
tion, "Alcoa" was free to raise its prices as it chose, since it was
free from domestic competition, save as it drew other metals into
the market as substitutes.' 46
The court considered this to be a monopoly within the meaning of
section 2 of the Sherman Act.147
In a section 7 case, United States v. Crocker-Anglo National
Bank,' 48 a federal district court, in dealing with the proposed
acquisition of Citizens National Bank by Crocker-Anglo, em-
phasized the distinction between foreign and domestic competition
in banking. In considering the relevance of the availability of
foreign bank resources, the court rejected the argument that total
resources of a foreign bank should be included in the universe
"since a foreign bank, even more so than a statewide bank, cannot
afford to risk all of its resources in a single market.' 49 Neverthe-
less, it pointed out that a foreign bank in California can shift its
relative lending power from a branch in one country to a branch in
143 Id.
144 Id. at 426.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 429.
148 277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
149 Id. at 163.
150 Id. at 164.
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another.15° The court determined that the difference in the abilities
of domestic and foreign banks to concentrate resources was only one
of degree. It only found it necessary to conclude that these foreign
resources yet further diminished Crocker-Anglo's share of the
market; therefore it concluded that the. acquisition had to be held
legal.151
Certainly Alcoa and Crocker-Anglo do not support the recent
contentions of some antitrust enforcement personnel that imports
can be ignored in evaluating an acquisition. If anything, they
wonld support an argument that imports should be given greater
weight than domestic production, because imports can be increased
more readily. Nevertheless, even this type of argument would be
inappropriate in a section 7 case. A future increase in imports is
only a possibility-and should not be considered in determining-
the validity of an acquisition. Thus, imports should be given no
greater, and no less, weight than locally-produced goods in anti-
trust analysis.
V
THE REGULATORS' VIEW OF IMPORTS
As noted previously, it has suited the Government's purpose
on several occasions of late, when proceeding against an acquisition
involving two domestic corporations, to exclude imports from the
relevant market in order to inflate market share statistics.15 2 Gen-
erally, however, the Government includes imports in the relevant
market. In doing so, it properly recognizes the indisputable fact
that imports are an essential part of United States commerce.
151 Id. at 199.
Joel Davidow, presently Chief of the Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust
Division, has stated that in dealing with a merger involving a foreign company whose sales
are hased upon imports, one need not accept the market share figure of the firm as
"equivalent to that of a firm with a plant in the U.S.," but that
[o]n the one hand, it might he considered that a 5% market share resulting solely
from imports is highly unstable because of exposure to devaluation, tariffs and
other international trade factors, and thus should be somewhat discounted in
applying merger guidelines or other merger standards.
On the other hand, there are situations in which a giant foreigu firm which has only
achieved minor import penetration of the U.S. market attempts to buy a firm here
with a substantial market share. We might conclude in that instance that its U.S.
market percentage significantly understates the competitive importance of the
acquiring firms and insist that the merger be viewed as eliminating not only actual
competition but a significant amount of potential competition.
Address by Joel Davidow, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Nov. 12, 1974.
152 See notes 125-38 and accompanying text supra.
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There is no question that all companies, domestic or foreign,
selling in this country are engaged in commerce in the United
States.' 53 Evidence that the Government regards imports as an
essential part of United States commerce can be found in the
Justice Department's challenge to the acquisition of an importer by
another importer and distributor in United States v. Schenley Indus-
tries, Inc.154 The action was terminated by a consent decree requir-
ing divestiture and limiting future acquisitions of any companies
which have "the right to produce and sell or the right to import
and sell" the product involved. 55 Similarly, the complaint in
another case challenged the acquisition of the largest importer of
the product involved by a domestic seller of the product, and
resulted in divestiture pursuant to a consent decree.' 56
Certainly, since imports are such an essential part of United
States commerce, to exclude them in determining the size of the
market seems completely unrealistic. Even the debates on passage
of the Sherman Act show that Congress recognized an important
relationship between imports and domestic competition. 157
A number of antitrust enforcement officials have emphasized
this relationship in recent years. The impact of imports as "an
important and significant competitive force"'158 was pointed out by
Judge McLaren while he was Assistant Attorney General in charge
of the Antitrust Division. He emphasized that "[w]here an existing
domestic industry is highly concentrated, the main pressure on
M5 See, e.g., United States v.Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966),
aff'd, 385 U.S. 37 (1966). The district court pointed out that
[t]he continuous flow of Labatt beer from Canada to Labatt's distributors in the
United States constitutes an engagement in foreign and interstate commerce by
John Labatt Limited.... John Labatt Limited engages in commerce in the United
States through its control of, and close business relationship with and assistance to,
General Brewing Corproation [a domestic subsidiary].
253 F. Supp. at 138.
154 1966 Trade Cas. 71,897 (S.D.N.Y.).
'5 1971 Trade Cas. 73,490, at 90,007 (S.D.N.Y.).
156 United States v. Insilco Corp., Civil No. C-304 (D. Conn., filed May 26, 1971),
terminated by consent decree, 1974 Trade Cas. 74,877 (D. Conn.) (acquisition of flatware
importer and seller Stanley Roberts by Insilco, large seller of stainless steel flatware).
However, Joel Davidow, Chief of the Antitrust Division's Foreign Commerce Section,
has stated:
It is not clear, and not settled, whether Section 7 of the Clayton Act applies to
foreign transactions or ones which affect only the export or import trade but not
the domestic commerce of the U.S."
Address by Joel Davidow, supra note 151.
157 K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 19 (1958); W. FUGATE,
supra note 8, at 7.
158 Address by Richard McLaren Before the National Industrial Conference Board, in
New York City, March 5, 1970.
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management to keep both costs and prices down may be the
existence of actual and potential competition from foreign or
multi-national firms."' 59 Likewise, Donald I. Baker, Director of
Policy Planning in the Antitrust Division, explained:
Foreign competition has proven particularly important to
Americans in two circumstances. The first concerns the situation
where most or all of the goods originate abroad. The second
occurs where we have a sluggish domestic industry, which very
much needs the spur of outside competition. The latter situation
has been particularly apparent in a number of our large
oligopolies-and, as a result, we have seen such products as small
cars and stainless steel razor blades become available in this
country largely because of the pressure of foreign firms selling
here.
[C]ompetition fi'om foreign owned firms-here or abroad-
can be a vital spur to competition in the U.S. market, and the
Department of Justice welcomes it for that reason. 160
One of the Antitrust Division's principal goals, therefore, has been
to ensure the accessibility of the United States market to foreign
companies.
Mr. Baker has stressed that "[e]ven where the goods in ques-
tion are produced in the United States, we have an important
national interest in seeing to it that major foreign firms are not
kept out of the United States market.' 61 Accordingly, it "is an
important goal of antitrust policy to preserve this kind of foreign
competition as a factor in the American market-and to deal with
international cartels that prevent it from happening."'62 This ap-
proach goes hand-in-hand with a "related type of antitrust en-
forcement . . . designed to preserve foreign firms as actual or
potential competitors in the United States market.'. 6 3
This expressed interest is not just empty words.16 4 Numerous
'59 Id. The same point was made subsequently by his successor, Walker G. Comegys,
while still Deputy Assistant Attorney General. Statement Presented to Senate Subcommittee
on Foreign Commerce and Tourism, supra note 7.
160 Address by Donald I. Baker, supra note 111, at B-I to B-2 (emphasis added); see
Address by Donald 1. Baker Before New York State Bar Ass'n Annual Meeting, in New
York City, Jan. 24, 1973, in 5 TRADE REG. REP'. 50,161, at 55,284-85 (U.S. Dep't of Justice
1973). See also Address by Thomas E. Kauper Before the New York State Bar Association, in
New York City, Jan. 24, 1973, in 5 TRADE REG. REP. 9 50,160, at 55,280 (1973).
161 Address hy Donald I. Baker, supra note 111, at B-1.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 The Justice Department has claimed success in its attempts to keep domestic
markets open to foreign competitors. Keith I. Clearwaters, while Special Assistant to the
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cases have been brought by the Department of Justice and the FTC
challenging acquisitions of foreign companies by domestic con-
cerns. In United States v. Gillette Co., 165 for example, the Justice
Department challenged the "acquisition by a dominant American
razor manufacturer of a leading European electric razor manufac-
turer which had not yet entered the United States market."'166
United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co. 167 was a successful chal-
lenge under section 7 of the acquisition by Schlitz of the stock of
Labatt, a foreign brewer with a United States subsidiary and with a
large volume of sales in the United States.' 68 As Mr. Fugate noted,
"the court did not treat the case differently than a domestic
merger. Further, while it was not important to the case, the court
did not distinguish imported from domestic beer. 1 69
In the Litton case,17 0 discussed previously,' 7 ' the FTC found
the acquisition by Litton, an American company, of Triumph-
Adler, a German company, to be a violation of section 7. The
decision outlined the rapid rise of Triumph-Adler as a competitor
in the American market from the time of its entry in the middle
1950's until the date of its acquisition.1 7 2 The FTC pointed out that
Assistant Attorney General, stated that "[b]ecause of [the Department's] continuing efforts to
keep United States commerce free from restrictive business practices, a foreign company can
market its product with confidence that it will not be subject to anticompetitive barriers."
Address by Keith I. Clearwaters, supra note 74, 5 TRADE REG. REP. 50,169, at 55,302 (U.S.
Dep't of Justice 1973).
165 Civil No. 68-141 (D. Mass. 1968).
166 Address by Donald I. Baker, supra note 111, at B-1.
167 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal. 1966), aff'd, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
168 The action also attacked the acquisition of another unrelated United States com-
pany, Burgermeister Brewing Corporation. 253 F. Supp. at 131.
169 W. FUGATE, supra note 8, at 345.
170 Litton Indus., Inc., 82 F.T.C. 793 (1973).
171 See notes 94-102 and accompanying text supra.
172 The FTC explained:
Triumph-Adler entered the United [States] typewriter market in the middle 1950's...
and sold office electric and office manual typewriters and portable typewriters
through an agent .... During the period 1963-1965, it established a nation-wide
distribution system of its own in the United States and by 1968 had about 800-1,000
dealers in the United States ....
82 F.T.C. at 992. The FTC pointed out that "[tihe United States sales of Adler typewriters
had experienced impressive growth, and the Adler office electric typewriter enjoyed a
reputation for superior quality and reliability." Id. at 985.
The Hearing Examiner, on the other hand, had concluded that Triumph-Adler had not
been a competitor in the United States typewriter market because foreign-based companies
such as Triumph-Adler "could not ship substantial percentages of their typewriter produc-
tion to the United States." [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,918 (FTC
1972).
In United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), the
court explained that new manufacturers of shoe machinery bad to be ready to service their
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"at the time of its acquisition by Litton in early 1969, Triumph-
Adler was a dynamic competitor with a strong international posi-
tion and a substantial position in the United States typewriter
market."' 73 Thus the market share of the imported machines could
not be ignored. Similar reasoning has formed the basis of other
successful challenges to acquisitions of foreign companies.17 4 Con-
versely, acquisitions by foreign companies-sometimes through
United States subsidiaries-of American companies have also been
attacked successfully by the United States antitrust enforcement
agencies. 17
5
Imports are not only protected from adverse private action by
section 7 enforcement, but perhaps more significantly by the scope
of the Sherman Act 17 6 and the Wilson Tariff Act. 17 7 As far back as
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., ' 7 8 the Supreme Court held that it
had jurisdiction of "a contract, combination and conspiracy entered
machines. However, as "the experience of foreign manufacturers indicates, this has proved
to be a serious stumbling block to those who have sought to compete with United." Id. at
325. Accordingly, where foreigners cannot compete and have not competed, they should not
be included in the United States market.
"" [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 20,267, at 22,299 (FTC 1973). The
FTC made clear that it considered Litton and Triumph-Adler to be "direct competitors." Id. at
984.
'71 See, e.g., United States v. United Fruit Co., 1958 Trade Cas. 68,941 (E.D. La.). This
was a Sherman Act case, in which, inter alia, the acquisition by United Fruit of International
Railways of Central America was challenged. The proceeding was terminated by a consent
decree requiring divestiture of International Railways, as well as the creation of a new
company capable of importing a substantial amount of competitive products into the United
States, and prohibiting numerous unlawful practices. See also United States v. Monsanto Co.,
1967 Trade Cas. 72,001 (W.D. Pa.). This case challenged a joint venture formed in the
United States by Monsanto with a German company Farbenfabriker Bayer, A.G. That action
was terminated by a consent decree requiring divestiture of the American company's
interest.
M United States v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 1971 Trade Cas. 73,689 (D. Mass.);
United States v. Ciba Corp., 50 F.R.D. 507 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); United States v. Aluminium
Ltd., 1966 Trade Cas. 71,895 (D.N.J.); United States v. Swiss Bank Corp., 1940-1943
Trade Cas. 56,188 (D.N.J. 1941); Holderbank Financiere Glasis S.A., [1970-1973 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 20,229 (FTC 1973); Imperial Chemical Indus., Ltd., [1970-1973
Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 19,914 (FTC 1972). See notes 112-14 & 116 and
accompanying text supra.
176 The Sherman Act prohibits, inter alia, "[elvery contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations" (15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970)) and any monopoly or "attempt to monopolize
... any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." 15
U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
177 The Wilson Tariff Act prohibits "[e]very combination, conspiracy, trust, [or] agree-
ment ... between two or more persons or corporations, either of whom ... is engaged in
importing any article... when such combination .. is intended to operate in restraint of
lawful trade or free competition." 15 U.S.G. § 8 (1970). This Act does not supersede the
Sherman Act. See United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818, 821 (N.D. Cal. 1957).
178 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
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into by parties within the United States and made effective by acts
done therein."'17 9 In the case at bar, the Court found that "[t]he
fundamental object was control of both importation and sale of
sisal and complete monopoly of both internal and external trade
and commerce therein.' ' ° It therefore held the agreements limit-
ing imports illegal, relying on the provisions of the Wilson Tariff
Act.' 8 '
In United States v. General Dyestuff Corp., 182 the court rejected
the defendant's novel argument "that the agreements, designed to
keep foreign chemicals from entry into the United States, cannot
be deemed to be against public policy because they serve the same
purposes as the tariff acts.' 18 3 The court explained that under the
Sherman and Wilson Acts, it was the intention of Congress to
subject "the imports of foreign commodities to public control and
regulation and [prohibit] such control and regulation by private
combination." 84
Another attack on import restrictions was made in United States
v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc.'8 5 There the
Government successfully challenged, under the Wilson Tariff Act
179 Id. at 276.
180 Id.
181 This was by no means the first decision in point. See, e.g., United States v. American
Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). Recently, in United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 409 U.S.
818 (1973), the Court attacked restrictions on licences granted to the United States com-
panies by the defendants, British drug companies.
Justice Jackson's dissent in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951), another well-known Sherman Act case involving restraint on interstate and foreign
commerce, suggested that restriction of foreign trade might require the application of rules
different from those normally applied to restrictions on United States commerce. Id. at 606.
In that case, the Court held illegal arrangements between a United States company and its
foreign competitors limiting competition in the United States market, Justice Frankfurter's
dissenting opinion succinctly explained the point of Justice Jackson's dissent: "[Tihe cir-
cumstances of foreign trade may alter the incidence of what in the setting of domestic
commerce would be a clear case of unreasonable restraint." Id. at 605. The 1955 Report of
the Attorney General's Committee on the Antitrust Laws agreed with Mr. Justice Frankfur-
ter that
under the Rule of Reason, defendants may proffer evidence that their activities
abroad constitute no undue restraint on our foreign commerce since, even absent
the challenged conduct, trade and investment in a particular foreign area would be
virtually impossible.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON THE ANTITRUST LAws, REPORT 83 (1955); see 341 U.S. at
605.
1s2 57 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
183 Id. at 649.
1s4 Id. See also, United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945),
aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
18' 1963 Trade Cas. 70,600 (S.D.N.Y.).
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and section 1 of the Sherman Act,18 6 conduct by Swiss and Ameri-
can defendants which imposed what it described as "unreasonable
restrictions on the manufacture [and] imports of watches" and
similar equipment in the United States.' 87
in Northern Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 8 the court had to deter-
mine the validity of a 'joint venture [which] appear[ed] to have
effectively prevented competition from arising among natural gas
suppliers selling to distributors in Michigan and Wisconsin, and
between the supplier of Canadian gas and those suppliers seeking
to market domestic gas."'18 9 it concluded that the joint venture was
illegal under the antitrust laws since it had "substantial anticom-
petitive effects on the marketing of gas in the upper Midwest."'190
Similarly, in United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co.,191 another
Sherman Act case, the Government was concerned with conduct
which excluded certain imports from the United States. The Su-
preme Court held such conduct illegal. 192
Recent statements by Antitrust Division officials reiterate their
interest in precluding any action which will limit imports. As
Donald Baker has explained, 193 the Government's interest goes
further-to encourage the flow of imports. He pointed out that
goods imported by foreign firms should be utilized "as a spur for
innovation and lower prices in American markets,"' 94 and that
foreign competition "has proven particularly important in some of
our highly concentrated industries.' ' 195 Among the recent cases
1 15 U.S.C. § 8 (1970); id. § 1.
187 1963 Trade Cas. 1 70,600, at 77,455 (S.D.N.Y.).
188 399 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
189 Id. at 963. The venture was challenged under § 7 of the Natural Gas Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 17f(1970).
190 399 F.2d at 963.
191 374 U.S. 174 (1968); see United States v. R.P. Oldham Co., 152 F. Supp. 818 (N.D.
Cal. 1957).
192 374 U.S. at 174.
193 Address by Donald I. Baker Before New York State Bar Ass'n Annual Meeting, in
New York City, Jan. 24, 1973, in 5 TRADE REG. REP. 1 50,161 (U.S. Dep't of Justice 1973).
194 Id., 5 TRADE REG. REP. at 55,285.
195 Id.
Our major concentrated industries in this country are a source of real public
concern. Some advocate breaking them up into smaller units. . . . A better
alternative may be to pursue the course followed in automobiles-to design our
trade policies in such a way that strong foreign competitors serve as a genuine
economic check on the efforts of even highly dominant, domestic firms. This may
be important in pricing and is dearly important in technology. Attempts to close
our borders to foreign products are bound to enhance the pressure for vast
structural relief in the American economy.
Id. at 55,286.
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cited by Mr. Baker to show the Government's action in support of
this policy was the attack on an agreement between Westinghouse
and Mitsubishi Electric Company. 196 In that case, which is still
pending, the Government has challenged as highly "oligopolistic' 1 97
agreements covering both patented and unpatented products which
it alleged had the broad effect of keeping the two companies out of
each other's "home markets."
The argument has been raised that the Government itself can
limit imports and, accordingly, imports should be treated differ-
ently.198 An answer is found in Standard Oil Co. (Indiana),'99
discussed previously.200 There the court, in determining whether
the acquisition of domestic oil and gas reserves substantially less-
ened competition, states that it "must" take into account "the fact
that extremely large quantities of foreign crude oil are available to
the domestic market." 0' In doing so, it pointed out that there was
a "Mandatory Oil Import Program" which it said "severely limits
the importation of crude oil, natural gas liquids, unfinished oils,
196 United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., Civil No. C-70-852-SAW (N.D. Cal., filed
April 22, 1970).
197 Id.; see Address by Donald I. Baker, supra note 193. See also United States v. Hercules
Inc., 1973 Trade Cas. $ 74,530 (D. Del.). In this case a joint venture between Hercules Inc.,
of Wilmington, Delaware, and Mitsui Petrochemical Industries, Ltd., of Japan (with a
wholly-owned subsidiary, Mitsui Petrochemical Industries (U.S.A.), Inc.), was challenged
under § 7 and the Sherman Act. According to the complaint, Hercules and Mitsui agreed to
the joint manufacture and sale of high density polyethylene in the United States and Mitsui
refrained from competing with Hercules in the United States in polypropylene because of
Mitsui's participation in the high density polyethylene joint venture. The action was termi-
nated by a consent decree requiring dissolution of the joint venture. Id.
Other recent actions have also sought to bar discrimination against foreign importers by
United States trade associations. See, e.g., United States v. Material Handling Institute, 1973
Trade Cas. 74,362 (W.D. Pa.); United States v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 1972
Trade Cas. 74,028 (S.D.N.Y.). Both cases were terminated by consent decrees prohibiting
such discrimination.
1"8 See, e.g., W. FUGATE, supra note 8, at 351; notes 129, 151 and accompanying text
supra. Imports have been controlled by statute under certain limited circumstances--e.g., if
they constitute unfair competition. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970). That section provides in
relevant part:
Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles
into the United States . . . the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or
substantially injure an industry, efficiently and economically operated, in the
United States ... are declared unlawful.
Whenever the existence of any such unfair method or act shall be established
... the articles ... shall be excluded from entry into the United States.
Id.
199 United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 1964 Trade Cas. 71,215 (N.D. Cal.).
200 See notes 80-81 and accompanying text supra.
201 1964 Trade Cas. at 79,847.
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and refined products. ' 20 2 This did not concern the court because,
as it stated, the Government
has the power at any time to lift those controls, in whole or in
part, should crude oil supplies become less than adequate or
crude oil prices become excessive. Except for [the Government's]
controls, overseas production is economically available to domes-
tic refiners and consumers. 20 3
The court held that the acquisition did not in fact substantially
impair competition.
With the exception of petroleum imports, there is no indica-
tion that the United States government intends to implement
drastic limitations on imports at this time. In his March 1973
International Economic Report, former President Nixon em-
phasized that the United States "must face up to more intense
long-term competition in the world's markets rather than shrink
from it."' 20 4 Outside of the area of energy policy, the present
administration has shown no intention to depart substantially from
that course.
To the extent that in the course of political disputes other
governments may raise the spectre of limiting imports into the
United States, the antitrust laws, as now written, cannot support
the exclusion of existing imports in evaluating market shares. Such
threats by foreign governments pose only a possibility of action;
but the antitrust laws, it is clearly settled, are concerned with
probabilities, not possibilities.2 °5 They are concerned with the mar-
ket as it is, or probably will be. Experience indicates that to ignore
foreign competition in the United States market would be to ignore
economic reality.
CONCLUSION
Despite repeated pronouncements by antitrust enforcement
agencies to the effect that foreign concerns should be treated the
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 R. NIXON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, March 20, 1973.
205 See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973); United
States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549, 555 (1971); United States v. Phillipsburg
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 365-66 (1970); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.
(Clorox), 386 U.S. 568, 577-78, 583-84 (1967); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S.
546, 551-52 (1966); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 594-95, 598 (1965);
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964); United States v. Penn-Olin
Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158, 170-77, 182 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,
374 U.S. 321, 362-63 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323, 333
(1962); United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589, 592, 597-98, 607
(1957).
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same as domestic concerns if they are selling their products in this
country, it is apparent that a degree of schizophrenia exists on this
issue. The purpose of this Article has been to collect and analyze
(1) the authorities which have either been faced with the question
or have in their decisions dealt with the issue without specifically
determining it, and (2) the pronouncements and conduct of the
antitrust enforcement agencies in regard to this issue.
It is clear that the case authority supports the inclusion of
imports in measuring the relevant market. Data including all sales
in the relevant market are generally utilized in section 7 cases. Such
sales data, rather than production data, are more appropriate to a
section 7 case, since sales more accurately reflect the true competi-
tive picture. Imports, regardless of source, should be treated no
differently from other sales in the relevant market, because they
also are a part of United States commerce and are generally as
available to the market as domestic goods. To ignore foreign
products sold in this country is to approach a complex economic
issue wearing blinders.
Some antitrust enforcement authorities disagree with this posi-
tion, apparently because they fear that consideration of imports in
evaluating a section 7 case may lead to a monopoly or oligopoly in
the United States, if at some time in the future such imports are
eliminated. But, if this is indeed their concern, they should not
seek a change in the law from the courts. They should instead urge
Congress to enact appropriate safeguards.
